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Abstract  
 
Background 
Increasing safety and security online can help boost the opportunities for people and 
businesses to trade, innovate and interact in digital markets. The level of online security 
is affected by technical factors, natural events and human behaviour. This study 
contributes to policy initiatives aimed at getting consumers to increase their online 
security. It tests several warning messages, based on behavioural insights, which could 
persuade consumers to behave more securely while online, thus diminishing their 
chances of suffering a cyber-attack.  
Methods 
A lab experiment was conducted in Spain (n=600). Participants had to make some online 
shopping decisions, and were assigned a quantity of money. An additional variable 
incentive depended on how secure their behaviour was during the purchasing process. 
Five security behaviours were observed: choosing a safe connection, providing less 
information during the sign-up process, choosing a strong password, choosing a trusted 
vendor, and logging-out. Each decision could increase their chances of suffering a cyber-
attack at the end of the experiment and losing part of their variable incentive. Other 
factors that could affect secure behaviour were measured through a pre-purchase and a 
post-purchase questionnaire. 
Findings 
Results show that long security messages and messages accompanied by a male 
anthropomorphic character led consumers to disclose less personal information when 
signing up to an e-commerce website. A loss-framed message made subjects more likely 
to choose a trusted vendor and to log out of a website after completing a purchase. It 
also made them behave more securely when security behaviour is treated as a 
composite indicator built on three behavioural measures (using trusted vendors, using 
secure passwords and logging out). None of the treatments was effective in making 
subjects choose a safe connection, or a stronger password.  
Conclusions 
The design of security messages has an effect on security behaviour. The policy 
implications are that security awareness messages should be designed based on 
behavioural insights and be piloted before implementation. The lack of effect of the 
security messages on choosing a stronger password should be further examined. This 
result may be related to consumers lacking information on what a strong password is, or 
lacking knowledge that could help them to relate stronger passwords with more secure 
behaviour online.  
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1. Introduction and policy context  
According to Europe's Digital Progress Report1, the number of European citizens ordering 
goods and services online increased by 13 percentage points between 2010 and 2015, to 
53 %. E-commerce is higher among younger and higher educated people, as with many 
other online activities. However, there are still some concerns about the lack of 
perceived security of online payments that prevents consumers from using the Internet 
for e-commerce (27% of respondents), trust concerns about receiving or returning 
goods, complaint / redress concerns (19% of respondents), and lack of the necessary 
skills (13% of respondents).  
Online security is influenced by natural events, technical failures and malicious threats, 
but human mistakes also play an important role. People’s online behaviour can become 
repetitive and monotonous, leading them to pay less attention and to attribute less 
importance to the decision-making process. People also behave unsafely online because 
they lack knowledge about the consequences of their online behaviour; because they 
perceive the risks as low; or because they do not follow the recommendations and 
advice on safety given to them. Users’ final actions will be influenced by their own 
awareness of security risks and their understanding of these, realistic self-efficacy, their 
exposure to cybercrime, overconfidence, and the cost of security products and services. 
One of the European Commission’s top priorities is the Digital Single Market2, which aims 
to break down the barriers that prevent consumers in Europe from going digital with 
freedom. The first step to removing these barriers is to build a secure and trustworthy 
infrastructure. Policy actions are being devoted to reinforcing the adoption of standards 
that lead consumers to increase their security while online. Hence, it is important to 
approach security-by-design principles and PETs (privacy-enhancing technologies). 
The present research contributes to this goal. It tests several warning messages that 
may persuade consumers to behave more securely while online, thus diminishing their 
chances of suffering a cyber-attack. These messages contain subtle differences in their 
wording, which are based on the literature of behavioural insights. The results presented 
in this report should help make consumers’ behaviour more secure and should, 
ultimately, benefit e-commerce through a better understanding of what a secure 
ecosystem means. 
This report presents the results from a test of the effect of ten different warning 
messages and assesses the policy implications that can be derived from these results. 
1.1  Behavioural insights  
Behavioural insights are increasingly popular policy tools for guiding citizens towards a 
desired behaviour (e.g. giving up smoking, saving energy saving, avoiding food waste) 
without enforcement. These insights can be applied to online behaviour (Pfleeger & 
Caputo, 2012; Rosoff, Cui, & John, 2013) and some of them have been tested in studies 
conducted by the Commission in support of EU policy. The most relevant insights on 
behaviour online for our study are described below. 
 Overconfidence effect: people have a tendency to overestimate their knowledge and 
their own judgment due to high self-assurance (Pallier, et al., 2002). This may 
increase risk-taking behaviour and lead individuals to believe wrongly that they 
control their own security (Nosic & Weber, 2010). Despite the risks of going online, 
these users may think that they will suffer no harm or that it is unlikely they will be 
                                           
1  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/europes-digital-progress-report-2016  
2  http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/  
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attacked. In the context of security behaviour, users will ignore warning messages 
concerning their security online because they believe it is unlikely they will be the 
victims of a cyber-attack. 
 Information overload: Individuals perceive that there are implicit costs in complying 
with security policies, such as increased cognitive load. Users will compute the extra 
effort that security mechanisms mean for them, and will compare it with the benefits 
obtained when they decide whether to comply or not (Beautement, Sasse & 
Wonham, 2009). 
Humans' capacity to process data and their attention span is limited. When there is 
too much information, users may feel that the harm that could be caused by ignoring 
this information does not warrant taking the time to read it. Information overload 
leads consumers to disregard relevant data when purchasing online (Jacoby, Speller 
& Berning, 1974; Scammon, 1977).  
Applied to security behaviour, this implies that long warning messages, which 
provide more information, will make users pay less rather than more attention to the 
message. Hypothesis 1 can be extracted from this insight, namely that subjects who 
receive a long security message will behave less securely than subjects who receive 
a short security message. 
 Tailoring effect: the effect of personalizing messages has been widely developed in 
behavioural research. Information elicited from the individual is often used to create 
a personalized message. It can be more effective in stimulating a positive change in 
behaviour than generic interventions (Brinberg, Axelson & Price, 2000; Lancaster, T., 
& Stead, 2005). As regards security behaviour, a personalized warning message will 
attract users' attention more than a generic message. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is that 
subjects who receive a personalized security message will behave more securely than 
subjects who receive one that is not personalized. 
 Social norms: norms are defined as rules, values and other criteria that are 
standardized as a consequence of the contact among individuals (Sheriff, 1936:3). 
Descriptive social norms tell us how others act in similar situations and shape our 
behaviour (Cialdini & Trost, 1998:152). The behaviour of the majority will have an 
effect on the individual due to social comparison, as individuals tend to avoid 
deviations from group consensus (Asch, 1956). Therefore, security warning 
messages based on descriptive norms should make users follow the majority. From 
this behavioural insight, two possible hypotheses can be tested:  
 Hypothesis 3: subjects who receive a positive normative security message will 
behave more securely than subjects who receive a security message that makes 
no reference to social norms.  
 Hypothesis 4: subjects who receive a negative normative security message will 
behave less securely than subjects who receive a security message that makes no 
reference to social norms. 
 Gain vs loss framing effect: these effects refer to individuals' propensity to react in 
different ways depending on how the information is presented. The literature shows 
that when subjects are involved with the issue, a framed message will have a 
stronger effect than a message with no frame (Millar & Millar, 2000; Rothman, 
Martino, Bedell, Detweiler & Salovey, 1999; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).  
When comparing gain and loss-framing, it seems individuals will strongly prefer to 
avoid losses than to acquire gains of the same value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough & Martin, 1993). Motivational theories explain 
this effect as a consequence of assigning stronger values to negative feelings than to 
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positive ones. However, this result depends on other factors such as how involved 
the subject is in the issue, or the level of risk of the behaviour itself (Banks, et al., 
1995; Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 2004).  
Security warning messages framed in terms of potential losses will generate greater 
dread, and therefore lead to more secure behaviour, than warning messages framed 
in terms of potential gains. The related hypotheses can be formulated as follows: 
 Hypothesis 5: subjects who receive a loss-framed security message will behave 
more securely than subjects who receive a security message without such 
framing. 
 Hypothesis 6: subjects who receive a gain-framed security message will not 
behave more securely than subjects who receive a security message without such 
framing. 
 Anthropomorphic character: including a humanoid figure in e-commerce contexts 
increases users’ trust and perception of enjoyment. This results is confirmed when 
the human-like character looks like a traditional salesperson who offers users a 
helping hand (Heckman & Wobbrock, 2000; Qiu & Benbasat, 2009). However, 
researchers do not agree on the effects that an anthropomorphic figure may have. 
Some consider that the feeling of being observed may reduce the amount of personal 
information people disclose (Groom & Calo, 2011). As a consequence, using an 
anthropomorphic figure accompanied by a security message may push users to 
follow what the character asks them to do and behave safely. 
In security warning messages, anthropomorphic characters should heighten users' 
attention. Hypothesis 7 is the following: subjects who receive a security message 
accompanied by an anthropomorphic character will behave more securely than 
subjects who see no character in the security message. 
 Visual indicator: visual signs that alert users about the level of online privacy and 
security may enhance their understanding of virtual notices. Users can use these 
signs as a faster way of obtaining information on the trustworthiness of the site they 
are visiting. Persuasive ambient technology has also been used to alert individuals, 
as it is easier to process than numerical feedback (Ham & Midden, 2010; Maan, 
Merkus, Ham & Midden, 2011). We therefore tested the hypothesis that subjects 
receiving a security message accompanied by a visual indicator will behave more 
securely than subjects who receive no visual indicator at all (Hypothesis 8). 
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2  Methodology 
The study was conducted in Spain as a lab experiment with 600 participants (50% 
females3). Subjects were asked to make some online shopping decisions, and were 
assigned a quantity of money. The incentive for participating in the experiment was 
divided in two parts. The first part was a show-up fee that they would receive just for 
participating in the experiment. The other part depended on how secure their behaviour 
was during the purchasing process, and they were told this during the instructions at the 
beginning of the experiment. However, they were not informed about what would be 
considered secure when they were online: this depended solely on their previous 
knowledge. Incentives related with participants’ performance during the experiment 
were required to simulate the risk they may take when going online. In the lab, it is not 
possible to introduce a virus in their computer or make them feel the risk of suffering a 
real cyber-attack. Since participants are not using their own computer, they may feel it 
is a safe environment. 
After the instructions and before the purchase process began, subjects had to fill in a 
questionnaire with items about their risk aversion and impulsivity. These items were 
measured before we assigned the participants to the different experimental treatments, 
because we did not want to test the effect of the treatments on risk aversion and 
impulsivity, but to test the effect of risk aversion and impulsivity on the behavioural 
measures. At the end of the purchase process, they were also asked to complete a 
second questionnaire. It included questions related to trust in the online environment, 
and trust in the e-commerce provider. Here they could also report, from a list of 
behaviours, how far they could reduce the probability of suffering a cyber-attack by 
following the described behaviours. The purpose was to use the questionnaire as a 
measure of their previous knowledge to test if this had any effect on their performance 
during the purchase. All the results from analysing the data obtained in both 
questionnaires are described in the annexes.  
2.1  Experimental procedure 
The Ethics Committee on Experimental Behavioural Economics of the ERI-CES4 approved 
this experiment, and confirmed that it adhered to the charter of ethics. The experiment 
was carried out between April and May 2015.  
The study targeted 60 subjects per experimental treatment and tested a total of ten 
security messages based on the literature on behavioural insights online mentioned in 
Section 1.1.  
Before the purchase process began, participants were asked some socio-demographic 
questions. In this part of the experiment, they had to provide their name, which would 
be used in the third treatment (personalized message) as explained below. Participants’ 
names were not stored on the data base to guarantee their anonymity.  
During the shopping process, subjects had to make several decisions that would affect 
their security, although they were not notified about the potential risks that these 
decisions entailed. The intention was to let them behave as they would in a non-
experimental environment. They had to buy a real product (i.e. wallpaper) during the 
experiment. All the messages appeared as pop-ups in the centre of the screen before the 
                                           
3  Further information on socio-demographics can be found in the Annexes (see Table a).Note 
that the sample is skewed in education level, which may have potential implications for the 
interpretation of the results.   
4  http://www.lineex.es/home/index.php?lang=en  
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purchase process began. Participants had to close the pop-up window to continue with 
the experiment. The message was then placed in the upper part of the screen.   
The ten experimental conditions were as follows: 
1. Control message: this condition presented a pop-up message associated about 
navigating safely. We had two choices as regards the control condition: first, we 
could have chosen to present an environment with no security message, and 
second, an environment with a message that was as simple as possible. We 
discarded the first option as it differed in two aspects from the treatment groups: 
(1) inclusion of a message vs. no message at all; and (2) the nature of the 
message itself. If we had chosen the control with no message and had found an 
effect, we would not have been able to say if the effect was due to having a 
message (no matter the wording) or to the literature based wording of the 
particular message. 
 
Navigate safely. 
 
2. Long message: this condition presented a pop-up with a longer neutral message 
about navigating safely. The rationale is that individuals would decide to ignore 
the message due to an 'information overload' effect. 
 
Browsing the Internet brings with it some risks. If you're seeing pop-
up ads that won't go away, or you suddenly have a homepage that 
you know you didn't set, you may have an unwanted programme 
installed on your computer. There are some steps you can take to 
get rid of this programme and block similar ones from getting 
installed in the future. Phishing happens when someone tries to trick 
you to make you share information, usually through a fake website. 
Malicious software refers to harmful or unwanted software that is 
installed on your computer without your knowledge. Navigate safely. 
 
3. Personalized message: this condition presented a neutral pop-up message 
about navigating safely. The message was personalized with the name of the 
subject. Subjects might feel that the message had been tailored to them and 
could pay more attention to it. 
 
'Name of the subject', navigate safely. 
 
4. Positive normative message: this condition presented a positive normative 
message together with the pop-up message about navigating safely. Social norms 
were expected to have an effect on participants’ behaviour and make them follow 
what the majority do. They were expected to try to avoid deviating from the 
group norm. 
 
 
The majority of the Internet users in Spain are concerned about 
issues related with their online security. These users are taking 
steps to avoid suffering a cyber-attack. 
Navigate safely. 
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5. Negative normative message: this condition presented a negative normative 
message together with the pop-up message about navigating safely. This 
message followed the same logic as the previous treatment, but the message was 
negatively framed. Participants were expected to avoid deviating from the group 
norm, even if it was erroneous. 
 
The majority of the Internet users in Spain are not concerned about 
issues related with their online security. These users are not taking 
steps to avoid suffering a cyber-attack. 
Navigate safely. 
 
6. Gain-framed warning message: this condition presented a gain-framed 
message together with the pop-up message about navigating safely. Gain-framed 
messages are more effective than messages with no frame, but the result also 
depends on the characteristics of the target subject.  
 
Navigate safely. 
If you do, you could win the maximum final endowment. 
 
7. Loss-framed warning message: this condition presented a loss-framed 
message together with the pop-up message about navigating safely. Loss-framed 
messages are also more effective than messages with no frame, and when they 
are compared with the gain-framed messages, their effectiveness is usually 
greater.  
 
Navigate safely. 
If you don't, you could lose part of the final endowment. 
 
8. Female anthropomorphic character: this condition presented the same 
warning message as the control condition, but showed a female anthropomorphic 
character inside the pop-up message.  
 
 Navigate safely. 
 
9. Male anthropomorphic character: this condition presented the same warning 
message as the control condition, but showed a male anthropomorphic character 
inside the pop-up message. 
 
 Navigate safely. 
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10. Visual indicator: this condition presented the same warning message as the 
control condition, but the screen of the e-commerce website was framed in red.  
 
  
Navigate safely.  
 
 
2.2  Behavioural output measures  
The experiment measured five behavioural outcomes that have been listed as 
requirements if users are to maintain cyber security (Coventry, Briggs, Jeske & van 
Moorsel, 2014). We focused on those that are related to purchasing processes online and 
that could be tested during a behavioural experiment. Participants had to make the 
decisions sequentially as follows: 
2.2.1  Secure connection 
Before entering the e-commerce website, participants had to connect to a simulated 
intranet. They could choose between two options (presented randomly): a secure vs. an 
unsecured connection. The variable 'secure connection' was binary. It scored zero if 
subjects chose to behave unsafely and selected the unsecured option; and one if they 
made the secure choice. The options appeared randomly on the left or right hand side of 
the screen to avoid location having an effect on participants' decisions.  
(a) Unsecured connection: this was an instant connection to a simulated intranet. 
Participants did not have to wait as the connection time was zero seconds and it did 
not require any password (see Figure 1).  
(b) Secure connection: for this connection, participants had to wait 60 seconds and they 
had to type in the WPA password that was provided on the screen. Participants were 
made aware that it would take 1 minute to connect but the connection was secure. 
When they chose this option, they had to insert a WPA password that was provided 
to them on the same screen, which meant they had to make extra effort to behave 
securely.  
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Figure 1: Information provided on the screen for the intranet connection 
 
 
The justification is that choosing a secure option has to reflect the compliance budget 
that users weigh to make a decision (Beautement, Sasse & Wonham, 2009). They have 
to choose between spending some extra time in the connection, and getting the benefits 
of avoiding a cyber-attack and lose part of their incentive for participating in the 
experiment; or choosing the immediate connection and not having to wait, but 
increasing the risk of losing part of the incentive. This first decision was designed to 
reflect real world costs in terms of more stringent cybersecurity behaviours.   
The next screen displayed a processing bar that charged during the connection. Below 
the bar, participants could see a button that allowed them to change to the unsecured 
but immediate connection, if they did not want to wait the whole minute. Including this 
possibility would let participants to change their mind as it might happen in the real 
world.  
Once subjects had connected to the intranet, they were able to see the e-commerce 
website. The home page contained the company name and logo. In the bottom left-hand 
corner, there was a link to the terms and conditions. The link contained information 
about how the data would be managed, used and stored; rights of the user, and 
copyright information. All this information followed the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC. Participants had to accept the terms and conditions during the sign-up 
process by clicking the button 'I agree to the Terms and Conditions'. However, it was not 
compulsory to open the link to the Terms and Conditions, so we expected a low rate of 
clicks on it. 
The homepage was the gate for the subjects to start choosing products (see Figure 2). 
When a subject clicked on a product, a detailed page for that product opened. On this 
page, the subject could click on the button 'buy' to begin the process, or could go back 
to see any other product offered.  
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Figure 2: Homepage to choose the product 
 
 
2.2.2  Password strength 
Having decided which product to buy, the subject then had to register by creating a 
username and a password (see Figure 3). The behavioural measure 'password strength' 
was the strength level of the password chosen. The construct was measured according 
to the following seven common security parameters and scored between zero (if subjects 
did not meet any of the parameters) and seven (if they met all): 
1. Minimum number of characters: 8 
2. Minimum number of lower case characters: 2 
3. Minimum number of upper case characters: 2 
4. Minimum number of numeric digit characters: 2 
5. Minimum number of special characters: 2 
6. Boolean check whether password contains the username 
7. Boolean check whether password contains the email 
2.2.3  Information provided in the sign-up  
During the registration process, after choosing the username and password, subjects 
were asked to provide some personal information (Figure 3). Participants had to provide 
the information marked with an asterisk (name, surname and email) in order to continue 
with the process, but they could choose whether or not to disclose the rest (gender, age, 
phone number, address, zip code, city, region and country). This is the usual information 
that is required in websites when registering or when making a purchase. e-Commerce 
providers find this information useful for sending targeted advertising. The behavioural 
measure 'sign-up info' scored between zero and eight, depending on the number of non-
compulsory items that subjects disclosed. In this experiment, personal data disclosed by 
the participants was not recorded in order to guarantee their anonymity. The secure 
behaviour related to this outcome was to disclose only the information required (marked 
with the asterisk) to complete the purchase. However, this variable is limited as a 
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measure of secure behaviour because we cannot ensure that the information provided in 
the non-compulsory items was true. 
From the moment subjects finished the registration until the end of the purchase 
process, the top right-hand side of the screen displayed the text 'Welcome' followed by 
their username, next to which was a button to log-out of the e-commerce website.  
 
Figure 3: Sign-up page 
 
 
2.2.4  Trusted vendor  
Once subjects had completed the registration process, confirmed their purchases and 
downloaded the product, they had to choose between two vendors. Both vendors offered 
the same product, but appeared on screen in varying orders (see Figure 4). The price 
offered by the first vendor for the product was zero (free). In this case, the link to 
download the product had no security signals (no image for an e-trusted site appeared). 
The simulated link for this supplier was http (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). The second 
vendor offered the product for €2, but the link to download it was of the type https 
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) and appeared next to an image indicating it was an 
e-trusted site. We gave different prices to the product depending on the security of the 
provider to reflect how in the online world users may obtain products for a zero price, 
but would have to pay a price related to their security. 
The behavioural measure 'trusted vendor' scored zero if participants chose the 
unsecured option at zero price, and scored one if they chose the secure option from the 
trusted provider. After they had selected one of the vendors, they had to introduce a 
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credit card number, CVV and expiry date. A simulated credit card was provided to 
participants at the beginning of the experiment to give a more realistic feel to the 
experiment.  
Figure 4: Selection of provider page 
 
 
2.2.5   Log-out  
Once subjects had completed the purchasing process, a new screen displayed 
information about the cost of the product purchased and how much they had left on their 
credit cards. A new button to the 'Next questionnaire' appeared at the bottom right-hand 
side of this screen.  However, the secure behaviour was to log-out before continuing 
with the second questionnaire (see Figure 5). Participants were not directly guided to 
log-out, but they were asked to exit the e-commerce website and complete the second 
questionnaire. The behavioural measure 'log-out' scored zero if they decided to click on 
the next questionnaire button, and one if they chose the safest option and decided to 
log-out first.  
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Figure 5: Log-out page 
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3.  Results 
This section presents the results of the statistical analysis to test the hypotheses 
proposed. We provide information on the distribution of the decisions made by the 
participants in this experiment over the five behavioural measures under consideration.  
In order to test the hypotheses proposed, we conducted a two-tailed t-test to see if the 
means of the control condition vs. the other conditions differed. We also added 
information regarding the subsamples (n=60), mean, standard deviation, and minimum 
and maximum score performed for each variable inside the group. 
3.1  Secure connection  
For this behavioural measure, we expected that subjects who received a long security 
message would choose the unsecured connection over the secure one compared with the 
control group, and would not wait the 60 seconds needed to connect securely. 
For Hypotheses 2 to 8, the security message should have the opposite effect. Subjects in 
conditions three to ten should choose the secure connection over the unsecured one 
compared to the control group. 
The first behavioural measure shows an unexpected trend. None of the treatments 
presented a significant difference with the control condition. Most of the subjects (98%) 
chose the secure connection, introduced the WPA password and waited for the more 
time-consuming option (see Figure 6). This means that none of the pop-up security 
messages was more effective than the control treatment, and that is why we have not 
included the results of the t-test in this subsection, as the groups did not differ. This 
decision about which connection to choose was the first one they had to make. Hence, 
the explanation for such a high rate of subjects choosing to behave securely and 
conducting to a ceiling effect could be that the warning message had a priming effect 
(Moon, 2000). As they had just seen a message warning them to navigate safely, just 
before they had to make the decision, the correct choice was very obvious at this point.  
Figure 6: Subjects who chose the secure vs unsecured connection 
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3.2  Password strength  
According to the hypotheses formulated, subjects who receive a long security message 
will choose less secure passwords that will comply with a lower number of security 
parameters, compared to subjects in the control group. However, if they are in 
conditions three to ten, they will do just the opposite and choose more secure passwords 
that will comply with a higher number of security parameters compared to the control 
group. 
Results show that when subjects had to choose the username and password, the 
manipulated pop-up messages had no significant effect on their behaviour compared to 
the control group (see Table 1). Subjects chose passwords that complied on average 
with four out of the seven parameters that ensure a secure password (M=4.21, 
SD=1.01).  
It is possible that participants did not have enough information on what we considered a 
strong password, as none of the treatments provided this information. Further research 
should test whether there is a significant difference when subjects already know how to 
create stronger passwords. Information on what a strong password is could be provided 
to them, to test if there is any change in their behaviour.  
 
Table 1: Results of hypotheses testing for 'password strength' 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Control 60 4.17 0.94 3 – 6  NA 
Long 60 4.40 1.18 1 – 6  0.2341 
Personalized 60 4.30 0.96 2 – 6  0.4445 
Positive 60 4.18 1.10 2 – 7  0.9290 
Negative 60 4.28 1.01 3 – 6 0.5141 
Gain 60 4.03 1.01 1 – 6  0.4555 
Loss 60 4.27 1.02 3 – 7  0.5785 
Female 60 4.22 0.99 2 – 6  0.7777 
Male 60 4.07 0.99 2 – 6  0.5717 
Visual indicator 60 4.22 0.94 2 – 6  0.7716 
# p-value (Control vs. treatment). No significant effect of any of the treatments 
 
3.3 Information provided in the sign-up  
We expected that subjects who received a long security message would provide more 
information during the registering process in the e-commerce website compared to 
subjects in the control group, as they would feel overwhelmed by so much information 
and would not pay attention to the security message telling them to navigate safely.  On 
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the other hand, in conditions three to ten, we expected that subjects would provide less 
personal information during the sign-up, compared to the control group. 
However, there were two pop-up messages that aimed to make subjects disclose less 
information compared to the control treatment: the long security message and the one 
displaying a male anthropomorphic character.  
Regarding the first result, contrary to what was expected, the long warning message 
made the participants behave more securely by providing less personal information. 
Hypothesis 1 (subjects who receive a long security message will behave less securely 
than subjects who receive a short security message) is not supported. One possible 
explanation for this result could be that the long message decreased the attention paid 
by subjects to the experiment, as the literature has suggested. Due to the information 
overload effect, they could feel overwhelmed by all the text they had to read and, as a 
consequence, end-up filling in fewer boxes on personal information in order to accelerate 
the purchase process.  
The result obtained for the male anthropomorphic character supports Hypothesis 7 
(subjects who receive a security message accompanied by an anthropomorphic character 
will behave more securely than subjects who see no character in the security message.) 
and enhances the evidence on how online social presence might decrease self-disclosure 
of personal information (Groom & Calo, 2011; Moon, 2000). The fact that the female 
character did not provide the same result, should be further investigated to find out 
whether there is any more evidence that shows a pattern regarding the effect of the 
character’s gender.  
The rest of the treatments showed no significant differences compared with the control 
in the t-test (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Results of hypotheses testing for 'sign-up info' 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Control 60 6.47 2.66 0 – 8  NA 
Long 60 5.25 3.35 0 – 8  0.0297** 
Personalized 60 5.85 3.19 0 – 8  0.2279 
Positive 60 5.67 3.10 0 – 8 0.1319 
Negative 60 6.08 3.02 0 – 8 0.4625 
Gain 60 6.42 2.66 0 – 8 0.9182 
Loss 60 5.78 3.15 0 – 8 0.2022 
Female 60 6.70 2.47 0 – 8 0.6195 
Male 60 5.27 3.40 0 – 8 0.0334** 
Light 60 5.60 3.06 0 – 8 0.1007 
# p-value (Control vs. treatment) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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3.4  Trusted vendor 
Subjects who were shown the long security message were expected to choose untrusted 
vendors over trusted ones compared to the control group, and get the product for free 
instead of paying the €2 price. On the other hand, subjects assigned to treatments three 
to ten were expected to do the opposite and choose the trusted vendors over the 
untrusted ones, compared to the control condition.  
When subjects had to choose between the trusted and untrusted vendors, one of the 
warning messages showed a significant effect compared to the control condition (t-test 
p-value = 0.0352; see Table 3). A loss-framed warning message was more effective in 
making participants choose the trusted vendor: 83% of the participants in this condition 
chose the secure vendor, compared to 67% of subjects in the control condition (see 
Figure 7). A higher proportion of participants decided to buy the product from the 
trusted vendor in the loss-framed condition, despite the fact that they had to pay €2, 
instead of getting it for free and not spending any of their incentive. Hypothesis 5 is 
supported for this behavioural measure (subjects who receive a loss-framed security 
message will behave more securely than subjects who receive a security message 
without such framing). 
Table 3: Results of hypotheses testing for ‘trusted vendor’ 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Control 60 0.67 0.48 0 – 1  NA 
Long 60 0.68 0.47 0 – 1  0.8471 
Personalized 60 0.58 0.50 0 - 1 0.3500 
Positive 60 0.68 0.47 0 - 1 0.8471 
Negative 60 0.65 0.48 0 - 1 0.8489 
Gain 60 0.70 0.46 0 - 1 0.6976 
Loss 60 0.83 0.38 0 - 1 0.0352** 
Female 60 0.62 0.49 0 - 1 0.5717 
Male 60 0.65 0.48 0 - 1 0.8489 
Light 60 0.67 0.48 0 - 1 1.0000 
# p-value (Control vs. treatment) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Figure 7: Subjects who chose the trusted vs untrusted vendor 
 
3.5  Log-out  
For this particular security behaviour, the hypotheses formulated led us to expect that 
fewer subjects in the long security message condition would log-out than subjects in the 
control group. Subjects assigned to treatments three to ten would do the opposite and 
more of them would log out than participants in the control group.  
Results show that the last cyber secure behaviour measured was also influenced by one 
of the warning messages. As in the case of the trusted vendor, when subjects received a 
loss-framed warning message, there was a significant difference in their behaviour 
compared with the control condition (t-test p-value = 0.0393; see Table 4). Hypothesis 
5 is also supported for this behavioural measure (subjects who receive a loss-framed 
security message will behave more securely than subjects who receive a security 
message without such framing). Up to 35% of the participants who were given the loss-
framed warning message treatment chose the cyber-secure decision and log out before 
they clicked on the next questionnaire button, while only 18% of participants in the 
control condition made this same decision (see Figure 8). None of the other treatments 
showed any significant difference with the control condition.  
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Table 4: Results of hypotheses testing for ‘log-out’ 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Control 60 0.18 0.39 0 - 1 NA 
Long 60 0.30 0.46 0 - 1 0.1378 
Personalized 60 0.28 0.45 0 - 1 0.1985 
Positive 60 0.22 0.42 0 - 1 0.6514 
Negative 60 0.27 0.45 0 - 1 0.2782 
Gain 60 0.20 0.40 0 - 1 0.8185 
Loss 60 0.35 0.48 0 - 1 0.0393** 
Female 60 0.30 0.46 0 - 1 0.1378 
Male 60 0.22 0.42 0 - 1 0.6514 
Light 60 0.18 0.39 0 - 1 1.0000 
# p-value (Control vs. treatment) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
 
Figure 8: Subjects who logged-out vs stayed connected 
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3.6 Cybersecurity index  
After conducting the data analysis, we found that security online is a complex concept 
that has various dimensions. In order to capture the maximum variability, we decided to 
build a new behavioural measure. This was a composite indicator, which included several 
individual indicators in a single index. This statistical measure was derived from the 
behavioural sources that seemed to be more reliable after analysing the results obtained 
in this experiment. The purpose was to obtain a new measure of cyber secure behaviour 
that captures several items of information, so it was composed as a multidimensional 
concept. All the indicators were equally weighted as there was no evidence that any of 
them should be reinforced. The formula used to compute the index was as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
7 + 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟 + log −𝑜𝑢𝑡
3
 
 
There are limitations to this index, as at the moment it only depicts a partial picture of 
what secure behaviour online really means. It could, however, be further developed in 
future research. The index includes information on four out of five of the mentioned 
behavioural measures that serve as indicators of secure behaviour. The first construct 
used in the lab experiment (secure connection) was excluded from the list of indicators 
as the data analysis showed that it was not a good measure of secure behaviour. For 
this first measure, we found that most of the participants were able to make the secure 
decision, probably because there was a priming effect (Forster & Davis, 1984) that 
lasted for the first few seconds after seeing the warning message, making this decision 
too obvious. The third construct (sign-up info) was also excluded from the cyber security 
index. The reason was that this measure did not capture whether the information that 
participants provided, in the case that they did so, was true or false. If the information 
had been true, it could have been risky to provide it; but if the information was false, 
the potential hazard disappeared.  
Hypothesis testing shows that only one of the treatments seems to have a significant 
effect. Hypothesis 5 (subjects who receive a loss-framed security message will behave 
more securely than subjects who receive a security message without such framing) is 
corroborated (t-test p-value = 0.0115; see Table 5), which means that subjects who 
received the loss-framed warning messaged scored higher values in the cyber secure 
index.  
Table 5: Results of hypotheses testing for ‘cyber security index' 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Control 60 0.48 0.23 0.14 – 0.95 NA 
Long 60 0.54 0.26 0.10 – 0.95 0.2132 
Personalized 60 0.49 0.28 0.10 – 0.95 0.7973 
Positive 60 0.50 0.24 0.14 – 0.95 0.6861   
Negative 60 0.51 0.22 0.14 – 0.95 0.4975 
Gain 60 0.49 0.22 0.05 – 0.95 0.8022 
Loss 60 0.60 0.25 0.14 – 0.95 0.0096*** 
Female 60 0.51 0.24 0.10 – 0.95 0.5675 
Male 60 0.48 0.23 0.14 – 0.95 0.9850 
Light 60 0.48 0.23 0.10 – 0.95   0.9552 
# p-value (Control vs. treatment) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05  
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4. Conclusion 
 
A number of findings can be extracted from this lab experiment. First, a loss-framed 
security message made subjects behave more securely by choosing a trusted vendor 
over an untrusted one and by logging out after purchasing on an e-commerce website. It 
also made subjects behave more securely online when cybersecurity was treated as a 
composite indicator build on three behavioural measures: choosing a trusted vendor, 
using secure passwords, and logging out. 
This result confirms that the way in which security messages are framed is very 
important. Warning people about potential losses is an effective option for encouraging 
people to behave more securely. However, further research could search for differences 
depending on the level of risk of the behaviour itself.  
Second, a long security message made subjects behave more securely online, as it made 
them disclose less personal information when signing-up to an e-commerce website5. 
The result was the opposite of what was expected (Hypothesis 1 stated that subjects 
receiving a long security message should behave less securely). Perhaps the information 
provided in the message required too much time and attention and reduced the time 
subjects wanted to spend on the registration process. The information overload effect 
could have worked in the opposite direction for this behavioural outcome compared to 
the other security measures. 
Third, a security message accompanied by a male anthropomorphic character was also 
effective in leading consumers to disclose less personal information when signing up. In 
this case, the relationship between the variables went in the direction expected. A male 
anthropomorphic character led to less disclosure of information, confirming previous 
results in the literature (Groom & Calo, 2011; Moon, 2000). The reason why only the 
male, and not the female, character had an effect should be further investigated.  
Fourth, the behavioural measure password strength showed no significant differences in 
any of the treatments compared to the control. This means that none of the security 
messages was effective in pushing the participants to use stronger passwords. This 
result may be related to users lacking information on what a strong password is, or 
lacking knowledge that could help them see the connection between stronger passwords 
and more secure behaviour online. This could be tested in subsequent studies by 
introducing further information into the security messages on (a) how using a stronger 
password can help increase the security level of online behaviour; and (b) indications of 
what makes a password strong.  
In sum, the design of warning messages can affect online security behaviour – users are 
sensitive to it. This has policy implications for the design of security messages and any 
policy initiative expecting citizens to behave in a particular way. New initiatives, 
therefore, should include a controlled pilot phase to test their effectiveness before being 
rolled out. 
  
                                           
5  However, we cannot guarantee that those who provided more information at this stage did not 
lie. This was a limitation of this measure. 
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Annex I: Socio-demographics   
The table below provides information on the socio-demographic distribution of the 
sample.  
 
Table 6: Socio-demographic distribution 
Variable  n % 
Gender 
Female 
 
300 
 
50 
Male 
 
300 50 
   
Age   
18 – 34  239 39.83 
35 and above 
 
361 60.17 
   
Education level   
No studies 5 0.83 
Primary or Secondary 
Education 
47 7.83 
FP or High School 281 46.83 
College Graduate 200 33.33 
Postgraduate 55 9.17 
PhD 11 1.83 
No answer 1 0.17 
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Annex II: Risk aversion 
The construct risk aversion was based on the Dospert scale (Blais & Weber, 2006; 
Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002) computed as an average of the scores that participants had 
on the 30 items scale. The latent variable presented high reliability with a Cronbach's 
alpha of 0.8380. Items are presented in Table 7. According to the scale, lower values in 
risk aversion mean that the subject is more risk averse. 
Table 7: Risk aversion 
Construct Question Answer 
Risk 
aversion 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you 
would engage in the described activity or behaviour if you were to find yourself 
in that situation. Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, 
using the following scale:  
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. 
2. Going camping in the wilderness. 
3. Betting a day's income at a casino. 
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. 
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. 
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. 
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. 
8. Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game. 
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman. 
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. 
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. 
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 
13. Going white-water rafting at high water in the spring. 
14. Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event. 
15. Engaging in unprotected sex. 
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. 
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt (reversed item). 
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. 
19. Taking a skydiving class. 
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. 
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. 
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. 
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen. 
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. 
25. Piloting a small plane. 
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. 
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. 
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. 
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. 
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains €200 (reversed item). 
Scale from: 
 
[1] Extremely 
unlikely to 
 
[5] Extremely likely. 
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Table 8 tested the effect of risk aversion on the behavioural outcome secure connection. 
The results showed no effect of risk aversion on choosing a trusted connection.  
 
Table 8: Anova to test the effect of risk aversion on secure connection 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .018696005 3 .006232002 0.27 0.8456 
Risk aversion .018696005 3 .006232002 0.27 0.8456 
Residual 13.6546373 596 .022910465   
Total 13.6733333 599 .022910465   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0014   
Root MSE       =     .151362  Adj R-squared = -0.0037 
 
 
Table 9 test the effect of risk aversion on the behavioural outcome password strength. 
There is a significant effect of risk aversion on password strength. However, the analysis 
of variance provides information on whether there is significant effect but it does not 
specify the direction of this result. An ordered probit regression provides further 
information (coeff. = .3965756; p-value = 0.000) letting us know that, contrary to what 
we expected, more risk averse subjects will choose weaker passwords.  
 
Table 9: Anova to test the effect of risk aversion on password strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 33.9190477 3 11.3063492 11.56 0.0000*** 
Risk aversion 33.9190477 3 11.3063492 11.56 0.0000*** 
Residual 582.774286 596 .977809204   
Total 616.693333 599 1.02953812   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0550  
Root MSE       =     .988842  Adj R-squared = 0.0502 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
 
Table 10 test the effect of Risk aversion on the behavioural outcome sign-up info. The 
results show no effect of risk aversion on the quantity of information that subjects 
provide during the sign-up process.  
 
Table 10: Anova to test the effect of risk aversion on sign-up info 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 71.3571235 3 23.7857078 2.60 0.0511 
Risk aversion 71.3571235 3 23.7857078 2.60 0.0511 
Residual 5444.22788 596 9.13461053   
Total 5515.585 599 9.20798831   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0129 
Root MSE       =     3.02235  Adj R-squared = 0.0080 
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Table 11 test the effect of risk aversion on the behavioural outcome trusted vendor. The 
results show no effect of risk aversion on choosing a trusted vendor. 
 
Table 11: Anova to test the effect of risk aversion on trusted vendor 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .939586678 3 .313195559 1.42 0.2345 
Risk aversion .939586678 3 .313195559 1.42 0.2345 
Residual 131.033747 596 .21985528   
Total 131.973333 599 .22032276   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0071 
Root MSE       =     .468887  Adj R-squared = 0.0021 
 
 
Table 12 tests the effect of risk aversion on the behavioural outcome log-out. The results 
show there is a significant effect of risk aversion on logging out. A probit regression 
provides information on the sign of the relationship (coeff. = .2887563; p-value = 
0.005). Again, contrary to what we expected, subjects who are more risk averse will 
have a lower probability of logging out.  
 
Table 12: Anova to test the effect of risk aversion on log-out 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 1.88298372 3 .627661241 3.38 0.0180** 
Risk aversion 1.88298372 3 .627661241 3.38 0.0180** 
Residual 110.617016 596 .185599021   
Total 112.5 599 .185599021   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0167 
Root MSE       =     .468887  Adj R-squared = 0.0021 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Annex III: Impulsivity   
Impulsivity was based on the 23-items Dickman's scale (Dickman, 1990; Dickman, 
1993; Dickman, 2000). This scale distinguishes between functional and dysfunctional 
impulsivity as in Table 13.  For this reason we have differentiated between two 
constructs: functional impulsivity and dysfunctional impulsivity (Table 14 and 15).  
Table 13: Impulsivity 
Construct Question Answer 
Impulsivity 
 
Please, answer to each of these questions with YES or NO:  
1. I don't like to make decisions quickly, even simple decisions, such as 
choosing what to wear, or what to have for dinner (F - reversed). 
2. I am good at taking advantage of unexpected opportunities, where you 
have to do something immediately or lose your chance (F) 
3. Most of the time, I can put my thoughts into words very rapidly (F). 
4. I am uncomfortable when I have to make up my mind rapidly (F - 
reversed). 
5. I like to take part in really fast-paced conversations, where you don't 
have much time to think before you speak (F). 
6. I don't like to do things quickly, even when I am doing something that is 
not very difficult (F - reversed). 
7. I would enjoy working at a job that required me to make a lot of split-
second decisions (F). 
8. I like sports and games in which you have to choose your next move 
very quickly (F). 
9. I have often missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make up my 
mind fast enough (F - reversed). 
10. People have admired me because I can think quickly (F). 
11. I try to avoid activities where you have to act without much time to 
think first (F - reversed). 
12. I will often say whatever comes into my head without thinking first (D). 
13. I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully (D – reversed). 
14. I frequently make appointments without thinking about whether I will be 
able to keep them (D). 
15. I frequently buy things without thinking about whether or not I can 
really afford them (D). 
16. I often make up my mind without taking the time to consider the 
situation from all angles (D). 
17. Often, I don't spend enough time thinking over a situation before I act 
(D). 
18. I often get into trouble because I don't think before I act (D). 
19. Many times the plans I make don't work out because I haven't gone 
over them carefully enough in advance (D). 
20. I rarely get involved in projects without first considering the potential 
problems (D - reversed). 
21. Before making any important decision, I carefully weigh the pros and 
cons (D - reversed). 
22. I am good at careful reasoning (D - reversed). 
23. I often say and do things without considering the consequences (D). 
Yes / No 
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The latent variables functional impulsivity and dysfunctional impulsivity presented high 
reliability (Tables 14 and 15). 
Table 14: Functional impulsivity 
Construct Cronbach's alpha Average interitem covariance 
Impulsivity_F    (a401- a411) 0.7886 .0604025 
 
Table 15: Dysfunctional impulsivity 
Construct Cronbach's alpha Average interitem covariance 
Impulsivity_D    (a412- a423) 0.7824 .0391679 
 
Table 16 test the effect of functional impulsivity on the behavioural outcome secure 
connection. The results show no effect of functional impulsivity on choosing a trusted 
connection.  
Table 16: Anova to test the effect of functional impulsivity on secure connection 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .27166856 11 .02469714 1.08 0.3719 
Functional impulsivity .27166856 11 .02469714 1.08 0.3719 
Residual 13.401665 588 .02279195   
Total 13.673333 599 .02282693   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0199   
Root MSE       =     .15097  Adj R-squared = 0.0015 
 
Table 17 test the effect of functional impulsivity on the behavioural outcome password 
strength. The results show no effect.  
Table 17: Anova to test the effect of functional impulsivity on password 
strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 14.199388 11 1.2908535 1.26 0.2442 
Functional impulsivity 14.199388 11 1.2908535 1.26 0.2442 
Residual 602.49394 588 1.0246496   
Total 616.69333 599 1.0295381   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0230  
Root MSE       =     1.01225  Adj R-squared = 0.0047 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table 18 test the effect of functional impulsivity on the behavioural outcome sign-up 
info. The results show no effect functional impulsivity on the quantity of information that 
subjects provide during the sign-up process.  
Table 18: Anova to test the effect of functional impulsivity on sign-up info 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 154.35381 11 14.032165 1.54 0.1134 
Functional impulsivity 154.35381 11 14.032165 1.54 0.1134 
Residual 5361.2312 588 9.1177401   
Total 5515.585         599 9.2079883     
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0280 
Root MSE       =     3.01956  Adj R-squared = 0.0098 
Table 19 test the effect of functional impulsivity on the behavioural outcome trusted 
vendor. The results show a significant effect. A probit regression provides information on 
the sign of the relationship (coeff. = .0548987; p-value = 0.009). Subjects who are 
more functionally impulsive will have a higher probability of choosing a trusted vendor 
when purchasing online, hence they will have a higher probability of behaving securely. 
Table 19: Anova to test the effect of functional impulsivity on trusted vendor 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 5.4035887 11 .49123534 2.28 0.0099 
Functional impulsivity 5.4035887 11 .49123534 2.28 0.0099 
Residual 126.56974 588 .21525467   
Total 131.97333 599 .22032276   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0409  
Root MSE       =     .463955  Adj R-squared = 0.0230 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Table 20 test the effect of functional impulsivity on the behavioural outcome log-out. The 
results show no effect of functional impulsivity on logging out.  
Table 20: Anova to test the effect of functional impulsivity on log-out 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 1.6689146 11 .15171951 0.80 0.6353 
Functional impulsivity 1.6689146 11 .15171951 0.80 0.6353 
Residual 110.83109 588 .18848824   
Total 112.5 599 .18781302   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0148 
Root MSE       =     .434152  Adj R-squared = -0.0036 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05  
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Annex IV: Trust in the online environment 
The construct trust online was computed as an average of the scores that participants 
had on a scale of 14 items (McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar, 2002). The latent variable 
presented excellent reliability with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9277 and average interitem 
covariance of 0.5207981. Items are presented in Table 21.  
Table 21: Trust in the online environment 
Construct Question Answer 
Trust online 
 
Please, choose in the table below the level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statements listed:  
1. I am comfortable making purchases or other 
activities on the Internet 
2. I feel that most Internet vendors would act in a 
customers' best interest. 
3. If a customer required help, most Internet vendors 
would do their best to help. 
4. Most Internet vendors are interested in customer 
wellbeing, not just their own wellbeing. 
5. I am comfortable relying on Internet vendors to 
meet their obligations. 
6. I feel fine doing business on the Internet since 
Internet vendors generally fulfil their agreements. 
7. I always feel confident that I can rely on Internet 
vendors to do their part when I interact with 
them. 
8. In general, most Internet vendors are competent 
at serving their customers. 
9. Most Internet vendors do a capable job at 
meeting customer needs. 
10. I feel that most Internet vendors are good at 
what they do. 
11. The Internet has enough safeguards to make me 
feel comfortable using it to transact personal 
business. 
12. I feel assured that legal and technological 
structures adequately protect me from problems 
on the Internet. 
13. I feel confident that encryption and other 
technological advances on the Internet make it 
safe for me to do business there. 
14. In general, the Internet is now a robust and safe 
environment in which to transact business. 
Scale from  
[1] Strongly agree  
[5] Strongly disagree. 
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Table 22 shows the effect of trust in the online environment on the behavioural outcome 
secure connection. The results indicate an effect of trust in the online environment on 
choosing a trusted connection. However, further probit regressions do not confirm this 
effect (p=0.335).  
Table 22: Anova to test the effect of trust in the online environment on secure 
connection 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .480485362 4 .120121341       5.42   0.0003 
Trust in the online 
environment 
.480485362           4 .120121341       5.42   0.0003 
Residual 13.192848         595 .022172854     
Total 13.673333         599 .02282693   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0351   
Root MSE       =     .148906      Adj R-squared =  0.0287 
 
Table 23 shows the effect of trust in the online environment on the behavioural outcome 
assword strength. The results show no effect.  
Table 23: Anova to test the effect of trust in the online environment on 
password strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 4.4011024           4 1.1002756       1.07   0.3709 
Trust in the online environment 4.4011024           4    1.1002756       1.07   0.3709 
Residual 612.29223         595 1.0290626     
Total 616.69333 599 1.0295381   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0071  
Root MSE       =     1.01443     Adj R-squared = 0.0005 
 
Table 24 test the effect of trust in the online environment on the behavioural outcome 
sign-up info. The results show an effect of trust in the online environment on the amount 
of information participants provided during the sign-up process. A probit regression 
provides information on the sign of the relationship (coeff. = .1960472; p-value = 
0.023). Subjects who show greater trust in the online environment disclose more 
personal information at the sign-up stage.  
Table 24: Anova to test the effect of trust in the online environment on sign-up 
info 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 104.2351           4    26.058775       2.87   0.0227 
Trust in the online environment 104.2351           4   26.058775       2.87   0.0227 
Residual 5411.3499         595 9.0947057     
Total 5515.585         599 9.2079883     
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0189 
Root MSE       =     3.01574      Adj R-squared = 0.0123 
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Table 25 test the effect of trust in the online environment on the behavioural outcome 
trusted vendor. The results show no effect of trust in the online environment on choosing 
a trusted vendor.  
 
Table 25: Anova to test the effect of trust in the online environment on trusted 
vendor 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .53648328           4    .13412082       0.61   0.6576 
Trust in the online environment .53648328           4  .13412082       0.61   0.6576 
Residual 131.43685         595 .22090227     
Total 131.97333 599 .22032276   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0041  
Root MSE       =     .470002      Adj R-squared = -0.0026 
Table 26 test the effect of trust in the online environment on the behavioural outcome 
log-out. The results show no effect of trust in the online environment on logging out.  
Table 26: Anova to test the effect of trust in the online environment on log-out 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 1.4529485           4 .36323713       1.95   0.1013 
Trust in the online environment 1.4529485           4  .36323713       1.95   0.1013 
Residual 111.04705         595 .1866337     
Total 112.5 599 .18781302   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0129 
Root MSE       =     .432011      Adj R-squared = 0.0063 
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Annex V: Trust in the e-commerce provider 
The construct trust provider was computed as an average of the scores that participants 
had on a scale of 10 items (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky & Saarinen, 
1999; McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar, 2002). The latent variable presented high 
reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.9277; Average interitem covariance = 0.5207981). 
Items are presented in Table 27.  
Table 27: Trust in the e-commerce provider 
Construct Question Answer 
Trust provider 
 
Please, choose in the table below the level of agreement or 
disagreement with the statements listed:  
1. I believe that LINEEX Buyvip would act in my best interest. 
2. If required help, LINEEX Buyvip would do its best to help me. 
3. LINEEX Buyvip is interested in my wellbeing, not just its own. 
4. LINEEX Buyvip is truthful in its dealings with me. 
5. LINEEX Buyvip is sincere and genuine. 
6. This e-commerce vendor is trustworthy. 
7. This e-commerce vendor provides reliable information. 
8. This e-commerce vendor keeps promises and commitments. 
9. This e-commerce vendor's behaviour meets my expectations. 
10. I find it necessary to be cautious with this store. 
Scale from 
 [1] Strongly agree  
[5] Strongly disagree. 
 
 
Table 28 shows the results from analysing the effect of the treatments on the level of 
trust in the e-commerce provider. There is no effect of any of the treatments on trust in 
the e-commerce provider, compared with the control group.  
Table 28: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on trust 
in the e-commerce provider 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .0195332    .1955404      0.10 0.920 -.3637189     .4027852 
Personalized -.1738157     195574 -0.89 0.374 -.5571337     .2095024 
Positive .4014195    .1969604      2.04 0.042 .0153842     .7874548 
Negative .220492    .1964318      1.12 0.262 -.1645072     .6054912 
Gain .1344993    .1961667 0.69 0.493 -.2499805      .518979 
Loss .1786775    .1962899      0.91 0.363 -.2060436     .5633986 
Female .0688717    .1960762      0.35 0.725 -.3154306     .4531741 
Male .0602622    .1956386      0.31 0.758 -.3231823     .4437068 
Visual id -.0427219    .1957885 -0.22 0.827 -.4264604     .3410165 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       11.58 
Prob > chi2       =     0.2383  Log likelihood = -718.80957                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0080 
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Annex VI: Knowledge  
Table 29 and 30 give information about the items included in the post-purchase 
questionnaire that were related with knowledge. In the subsequent pages we have 
included the results from analysing the effect of treatments on knowledge related items, 
and the effect of knowledge related items on the behavioural outcomes measured.  
 
Table 29: Perceived knowledge 
Construct Question Answer 
Perceived knowledge 
 
How well informed do you feel about the 
risks of cybercrime?  
1. Not at all informed. 
2. Not very well informed. 
3. Somewhat informed. 
4. Fairly well informed. 
5. Very well informed. 
 
Table 30: Knowledge 
Construct Question Answer 
Knowledge 
 
Which of the following behaviours do you think 
can help you prevent from being attacked while 
online? 
Provide a rating from  
[1] It won't reduce my risk at all 
to 
[5] It will reduce my risk 
extremely 
Knowledge_safe Connecting to a trusted connection. 
Knowledge_pswd1 Using a strong password. 
Knowledge_pswd2 Changing your password frequently. 
Knowledge_pswd3 Avoid using the same password for different 
sites. 
Knowledge_signup Providing minimum information. 
Knowledge_trust Connecting to a trusted site. 
Knowledge_logout Logging out. 
Knowledge_soft1 Using anti-virus software and firewalls. 
Knowledge_soft2 Updating software to the latest version. 
Knowledge_public Avoiding access to my personal accounts in 
public places. 
 
The next table shows there is no effect of any of the treatment groups on perceived 
knowledge, compared with the control group (i.e. none of the treatments made subjects 
feel more or less informed about the risks of cybercrime).  
Table 31: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
perceived knowledge 
TTreatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .2332664 .1939215 1.20 0.229 -.1468127 .6133456 
Personalized -.2587961     .193495     -1.34 0.181 -.6380392     .1204471 
Positive -.0556485    .1937408     -0.29 0.774 -.4353735     .3240764 
Negative -.1260651    .1931002     -0.65 0.514 -.5045346     .2524044 
Gain -.0031957    .1934928 -0.02 0.987 -.3824346     .3760432 
Loss .0868073    .1930783      0.45 0.653 -.2916192     .4652339 
Female .0374471    .1932064      0.19 0.846 -.3412304     .4161246 
Male -.0181604    .1933668     -0.09 0.925 -.3971525     .3608317 
Visual id .0527654 .1931794      0.27 0.785 -.3258593     .4313901 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       8.08 
Prob > chi2       =     0.5260  Log likelihood = -789.60292                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0051 
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Table 32 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_safe compared to the 
control group. 
Table 32: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_safe 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .0604554    .2032446      0.30 0.766 -.3378966     .4588074 
Personalized .0709599    .2036128      0.35 0.727 -.3281138     .4700335 
Positive .2076836 .2047389      1.01 0.310 -.1935973     .6089645 
Negative .0673573 .203257      0.33 0.740 -.3310191     .4657337 
Gain .2363826    .2059386      1.15 0.251 -.1672496     .6400148 
Loss .2308275    .2055136      1.12 0.261 -.1719717     . 6336267 
Female -.1210464    .2015109     -0.60 0.548 -.5160004     . 2739077 
Male -.2338345    .2003818     -1.17 0.243 -.6265756     .1589066 
Visual id .1249636    2039358   0.61 0.540 -.2747431     .5246704 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       10.17 
Prob > chi2       =     0.3369  Log likelihood = -672.82244                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0075 
 
Table 33 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_pswd1 compared to the 
control group. 
Table 33: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_pswd1 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .0990497    .2028759 0.49 0.625 -.2985798     .4966792 
Personalized .1893817    .2049022      0.92 0.355 -.2122192     .5909826 
Positive .2507903    .2053491      1.22 0.222 -.1516866     .6532672 
Negative .0918029    .2022107      0.45 0.650 -.3045228     .4881285 
Gain .3153935    .2070763 1.52 0.128 -.0904685     .7212555 
Loss .260954    .2053197      1.27 0.204 -.1414651     .6633731 
Female -.1421162    .2001148     -0.71 0.478 -.5343339     .2501016 
Male -.2058515    .1998837     -1.03 0.303 -.5976164     .1859134 
Visual id .0407208 .2019394      0.20 0.840 -.3550732     . 4365147 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       12.86 
Prob > chi2       =     0.1689  Log likelihood = -685.54666                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0093 
 
Table 34 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_pswd2 compared to the 
control group. 
 
Table 34: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_pswd2 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .2230119    .2040504      1.09    0.274 -.1769195     .6229434 
Personalized .0243323    .2018169      0.12 0.904 -.3712215     .4198862 
Positive .0613403    .2019032 0.30 0.761 -.3343827     .4570634 
Negative -.1089494    .2003389 -0.54 0.587 -.5016064     .2837077 
Gain .2225366    .2047026      1.09 0.277 -.178673     .6237462 
Loss .2257531    .2047311      1.10 0.270 -.1755126     .6270187 
Female .0921139 .2026401 0.45 0.649 -.3050535     .4892813 
Male .0549412     .201563      0.27 0.785 -.3401149     .4499974 
Visual id .1075741    .2023848      0.53 0.595 -.2890928      .504241 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       5.17 
Prob > chi2       =     0.8193  Log likelihood = -695.57447                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0037 
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Table 35 shows that there is an effect of several treatments on the item of treatments 
on the item knowledge_pswd3. The negative normative, gain and loss-framed, female 
anthropomorphic character and the visual indicator treatments have a positive effect on 
knowledge_pswd3 compared to the control group. 
Table 35: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_pswd3 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .310477    .2024902      1.53 0.125 -.0863965     .7073505 
Personalized .1721796    .2006975      0.86 0.391 -.2211803     .5655394 
Positive .2085422    .2003375      1.04 0.298    -.184112     .6011964 
Negative .4130974     .203572      2.03 0.042 .0141036     .8120912 
Gain .4130974     .203572      2.03 0.042 .0141036     .8120912 
Loss .5554429    .2071574      2.68 0.007 .1494217      .961464 
Female .4823346     .205191      2.35 0.019 .0801676     .8845015 
Male .1569392    .1993777      0.79 0.431 -.2338339     .5477122 
Visual id .4377518    .2039213      2.15 0.032 .0380734     .8374301 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       13.10 
Prob > chi2       =     0.1583  Log likelihood = -698.99083             Pseudo R2         =     0.0093 
 
Table 36 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_signup compared to the 
control group. 
 
Table 36: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_signup 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long -.1629619    .1962479     -0.83 0.406 -.5476008     .2216769 
Personalized -.0715575    .1973754 -0.36 0.717 -.4584061     .3152911 
Positive -.0285881    .1969752     -0.15 0.885 -.4146524     .3574763 
Negative .0562473    .1984672      0.28 0.777 -.3327413      .445236 
Gain -.0551609    .1968491     -0.28 0.779 -.440978     .3306563 
Loss .3072582    .2009564      1.53 0.126 -.0866092     .7011256 
Female .2070848    .2009194      1.03 0.303 -.18671     .6008797 
Male -.0216561    .1976419     -0.11 0.913 -.4090272      .365715 
Visual id .2428927    .2000433      1.21 0.225 -.1491851     .6349704 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       10.56 
Prob > chi2       =     0.3074  Log likelihood = -784.12873                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0067 
 
Table 37 shows that gain and loss-framed security messages have a positive effect on 
the item knowledge_trust compared to the control group. 
Table 37: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_trust 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .1280212    .2062597 0.62 0.535 -.2762404     .5322829 
Personalized .1761076    .2074243      0.85 0.396 -.2304365     .5826517 
Positive .3327227    .2100281      1.58 0.113 -.0789248     .7443701 
Negative .0996481     .205528 0.48 0.628 -.3031795     .5024757 
Gain .5145198    .2147816      2.40 0.017 .0935555      .935484 
Loss .4885981    .2134252      2.29 0.022 .0702923     .9069038 
Female .034575    .2045424      0.17 0.866 -.3663207     .4354707 
Male .1284136    .2058505      0.62 0.533 -.2750459     .5318731 
Visual id .1773313    .2066422      0.86 0.391 -.22768     .5823425 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       12.35 
Prob > chi2       =     0.1942  Log likelihood = -607.67649                Pseudo R2         =     0.0101 
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Table 38 shows that the personalized security message has a positive effect on the item 
knowledge_logout compared to the control group. 
Table 38: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_logout 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .0751808    .2015535      0.37 0.709 -.3198569     .4702184 
Personalized .4701044 .2105141      2.23 0.026 .0575043     .8827045 
Positive .2891167   .2056824 1.41 0.160 -.1140134     .6922468 
Negative .2941972    .2054425      1.43 0.152 -.1084627      .696857 
Gain .3483072    .2085126      1.67 0.095 -.06037     .7569844 
Loss .3947567    .2078651 1.90 0.058 -.0126515     .8021649 
Female 2980087 .2057603      1.45 0.148 -.1052742     .7012915 
Male .0362993    .2012758      0.18 0.857 -.358194     .4307926 
Visual id .017717 .2009849 0.09 0.930 -.3762062     .4116402 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       12.45 
Prob > chi2       =     0.1893  Log likelihood = -685.41583            Pseudo R2  = 0.0090 
Table 39 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_soft1 compared to the 
control group. 
Table 39: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_soft1 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long -.1062479    .2108163 -0.50 0.614 -.5194403     .3069445 
Personalized .056772    .2134403      0.27 0.790 -.3615632     .4751072 
Positive -.2312815    .2081436     -1.11 0.266 -.6392354     .1766724 
Negative -.2078111    .2081875 -1.00 0.318 -.6158512      .200229 
Gain .0617064     .213286      0.29 0.772 -.3563266     .4797393 
Loss -.0014358    .2122635     -0.01 0.995 -.4174646     .4145931 
Female -.1168473    .2088313     -0.56 0.576 -.5261491     .2924545 
Male -.1285453    .2088715     -0.62 0.538 -.5379259     .2808353 
Visual id .04334    .2128888 0.20 0.839 -.3739144     .4605943 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       4.88 
Prob > chi2       =     0.8449  Log likelihood = -642.60538                 Pseudo R2         =     0.0038 
Table 40 shows no effect of treatments on the item knowledge_soft2 compared to the 
control group. 
Table 40: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_soft2 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .0729965    .1932428 0.38 0.706 -.3057525     .4517455 
Personalized .136812    .1946376      0.70 0.482 -.2446706     .5182947 
Positive -.0391277    .1935103     -0.20 0.840 -.4184008     .3401455 
Negative .1376376    .1943177      0.71 0.479 -.2432182     .5184933 
Gain .0933604    .1936109      0.48 0.630 -.28611     .4728307 
Loss -.039291    .1929705     -0.20 0.839 -.4175063     .3389244 
Female .1148152    .1934244      0.59 0.553 -.2642896     .4939201 
Male -.139057    .1918896     -0.72 0.469 -.5151537     .2370397 
Visual id .0009505    .1937703      0.00 0.996 -.3788322     .3807333 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       4.04 
Prob > chi2       =     0.9088  Log likelihood = -848.62809                Pseudo R2 =  0.0024 
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Table 41 shows that the male anthropomorphic character has a positive effect on the 
item knowledge_public compared to the control group. 
Table 41: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
knowledge_public 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Long .113067    .2105675      0.54 0.591 -.2996378     .5257718 
Personalized .1434545    .2131517      0.67 0.501 -.2743152     .5612242 
Positive .1788493    .2142194      0.83 0.404 -.2410129     .5987116 
Negative .1892171    .2134107      0.89 0.375 -.2290602     .6074944 
Gain .1002841    .2122727      0.47 0.637 -.3157627     .5163309 
Loss .2612154    .2146086      1.22 0.224 -.1594098     .6818406 
Female .3426481    .2180533      1.57 0.116 -.0847285     .7700246 
Male .4447218    .2212366      2.01 0.044 .0111061     .8783375 
Visual id .251784    .2144747      1.17 0.240 -.1685787     .6721467 
Number of obs     =        600  LR chi2(9)        =       6.04 
Prob > chi2       =     0.7358  Log likelihood = -613.26132                Pseudo R2         =     0.0049 
From this point, the tables provide the results of testing knowledge items with their 
related behavioural outcomes. It means that, for example, knowledge_safe (knowing 
that connecting to a trusted connection can help you prevent from being attacked while 
online), should have a positive effect on the behavioural outcome secure connection 
(choosing a secure connection over an unsecured one).  
Table 42 shows the effect of knowledge_safe on the behavioural outcome secure 
connection. There is a positive significant effect of knowing that connecting to a trusted 
connection may help prevent from being attacked while online, and performing the 
behaviour of choosing a trusted connection. 
Table 42: Anova to test the effect of knowledge on secure connection 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .29383881 4 .0734597 3.27 0.0115 
Knowledge_safe .29383881 4 .0734597 3.27 0.0115 
Residual 13.379495 595 .02248655   
Total 13.673333 599 .02282693   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0215 
Root MSE       =     .149955  Adj R-squared = 0.0149 
 
Table 43 test the effect of knowledge_pswd1 on the behavioural outcome password 
strength. The results show no effect of knowledge on the dependent variable. 
Table 43: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_pswd1 on password strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 8.3198552 4 2.0799638 2.03 0.0881 
Knowledge_pswd1 8.3198552 4 2.0799638 2.03 0.0881 
Residual 608.37348 595 1.0224764   
Total 616.69333 599 1.0224764   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0135 
Root MSE       =     1.01118  Adj R-squared = 0.0069 
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Table 44 test the effect of knowledge_pswd2 on the behavioural outcome password 
strength. The results show no effect of knowledge on the dependent variable. 
Table 44: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_pswd2 on password strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model .61449469 4 .15362367 0.15 0.9637 
Knowledge_pswd2 .61449469 4 .15362367 0.15 0.9637 
Residual 616.07884 595 1.0354266   
Total 616.6933 599 1.0295381   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0010 
Root MSE       =     1.01756  Adj R-squared = -0.0057 
 
Table 45 tests the effect of knowledge_pswd3 on the behavioural outcome password 
strength. The results show no effect of knowledge on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 45: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_pswd3 on password strength 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 1.5597442 4 .38993604 0.38 0.8250 
Knowledge_pswd3 1.5597442 4 .38993604 0.38 0.8250 
Residual 615.13359 595 1.033838   
Total 616.69333 599 1.0295381   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0025 
Root MSE       =     1.01678  Adj R-squared = -0.0042 
 
Table 46 test the effect of knowledge_signup on the behavioural outcome sign-up info. 
The results show no effect of knowledge on the dependent variable. 
Table 46: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_signup on sign-up info 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 81.082451 4 20.270613 2.22 0.0656 
Knowledge_signup 81.082451 4 20.270613 2.22 0.0656 
Residual 5434.5025 595 9.1336177   
Total 5515.585 599 9.2079883   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0147 
Root MSE       =     3.02219  Adj R-squared = 0.0081 
 
Table 47 test the effect of knowledge_trust on the behavioural outcome trusted vendor. 
There is a positive significant effect of knowing that connecting to a trusted site may 
help prevent from being attacked while online, and performing the behaviour of choosing 
a trusted provider. 
Table 47: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_trust on trusted vendor 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 2.9258779 4 .73146948 3.37 0.0096 
Knowledge_trust 2.9258779 4 .73146948 3.37 0.0096 
Residual 129.04746 595 .21688648   
Total 131.97333 599 .22032276   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0022 
Root MSE       =     .465711  Adj R-squared = 0.0156 
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Table 48 test the effect of knowledge_logout on the behavioural outcome log-out. The 
results show no effect of knowledge on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 48: Anova to test the effect of knowledge_logout on log-out 
Source Partial SS Df MS F Prob>F 
Model 1.2590501 4 .31476252 1.68 0.1522 
Knowledge_logout 1.2590501 4 .31476252 1.68 0.1522 
Residual 111.24095 595 .18695958   
Total 112.5 599 .18781302   
Number of obs     =        600  R-squared        =       0.0112 
Root MSE       =     .432388  Adj R-squared = 0.0045 
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